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CRIMINAL LAW
I. REBUTTAL OF GENERAL PRESUMPTION THAT ALL CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS ARE SANE
In State v. Milian-Hernandez' the Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that once a criminal defendant presents sufficient
evidence of insanity to rebut the general presumption that all
criminal defendants are sane, the presumption will no longer ex-
ist to weigh in the prosecution's favor. Therefore, if the accused
proffers valid evidence of insanity, he is entitled to a directed
verdict unless the State presents evidence "from which a jury
could find the defendant sane."'2 Once rebutted, the presump-
tion alone can no longer create a jury question of defendant's
sanity.
Mario Milian-Hernandez was a Cuban refugee who feared
for his safety after another Cuban threatened him in California.
After the threats, the defendant fled California for Chicago. He
left Chicago by bus destined for Texas, via Washington, D.C.,
and the Carolinas. Several encounters with Spanish-speaking in-
dividuals during the trip fueled his suspicions that he was being
followed and that his life was in danger. Shortly after the bus
entered South Carolina, the defendant shot and seriously
wounded two other passengers on the bus. After remaining on
the bus for approximately twenty minutes, the defendant ran
into nearby woods. The next morning he surrendered to police.3
An investigation revealed no motive for the shootings other
than the defendant's belief that the two passengers were in
league with the man who had threatened him in California. Af-
ter undergoing six months of psychiatric treatment, the defend-
ant was found competent to stand trial. At trial the jury re-
turned guilty verdicts on two counts of assault and battery with
intent to kill. The appeal to the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina questioned whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant
1. 287 S.C. 183, 336 S.E.2d 476 (1985).
2. Id. at 185, 336 S.E.2d at 477.
3. Id. at 184-85, 336 S.E.2d at 477.
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a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.4
In reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court
noted the general view that in every criminal case an initial pre-
sumption arises that the defendant is sane.5 The court also reaf-
firmed the rule expressed in earlier South Carolina decisions
that insanity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and
proved by the defendant.6 Therefore, in order to assert a suc-
cessful plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, a defendant must
not only put sanity in issue by overcoming the presumption, but
must also offer evidence sufficient to prove insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
In Milian-Hernandez several physicians testified at the trial
concerning the defendant's mental instability." The supreme
court, however, found that the prosecution had failed to intro-
duce sufficient evidence of the defendant's sanity.9 Conse-
4. Id. at 185, 336 S.E.2d at 477.
5. See State v. Livingston, 233 S.C. 400, 105 S.E.2d 73 (1958); State v. Bundy, 24
S.C. 439 (1885).
6. See State v. Hinson, 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E.2d 548 (1970); State v. Bundy, 24 S.C.
439 (1885). There is a split of authority concerning who has the burden of proving sanity
or insanity once it has been put in issue at trial. Some jurisdictions place the burden on
the accused to prove insanity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 20(b) (Supp. 1984); Knight v. State,
273 Ala. 480, 142 So. 2d 899 (1962); People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288, 363 P.2d 865, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1961); State v. Hathorn, 395 So. 2d 783 (La. 1981); State v. Johnson, 298 N.C.
743, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979); Jones v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 236, 117 S.E.2d 67 (1960).
Other jurisdictions place the burden on the prosecution to prove sanity. See, e.g., State
v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967); People v. Ware, 187 Colo. 28, 528 P.2d 224
(1974); People v. Hawkins, 53 Ill. 2d 181, 290 N.E.2d 231 (1972); State v. Bates, 226 Kan.
277, 597 P.2d 646 (1979); Commonwealth v. Soaris, 275 Mass. 291, 175 N.E. 491 (1931);
Commonwealth v. Donofrio, 274 Pa. Super. 345, 372 A.2d 859 (1977).
7. See State v. Hinson, 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E.2d 548 (1970).
8. The test used in South Carolina to determine whether an individual has the ca-
pacity to form a guilty intention and thus be held responsible for his crimes is the
M'Naghten test. State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978). The test is whether
the accused had the mental capacity to distinguish moral and legal right from moral and
legal wrong and to recognize the particular act charged as morally or legally wrong. Of
the three doctors that testified for the defendant, only one testified that the defendant
did not have criminal responsibility. Record at 130, 137. Another doctor testified that the
defendant suffered from an acute paranoia disorder, but was unable to testify as to de-
fendant's capacity under M'Naghten because he had not been asked to conduct such a
review. Id. at 100. The third doctor was unable to formulate an opinion on defendant's
capacity under the rule because he had not made a formal determination of defendant's
capacity. Id. at 5.
9. The prosecution argued that the defendant's flight from the scene of the crime
was evidence of sanity and cited as authority State v. Thompson, 278 S.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d
581, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938, reh'g denied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982). Milian-Hernandez,
2
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quently, in the absence of an affirmative showing of sanity, the
defendant's evidence of insanity, as accepted by the court,1" was
sufficient to overcome the presumption of sanity and meet the
defendant's ultimate burden of proof.1" Nevertheless, the prose-
cution argued that the initial presumption of sanity alone was
sufficient to create a jury question concerning the defendant's
sanity and, therefore, the jury verdict should stand.12 The su-
preme court, however, stated that the presumption disappears
when evidence of sanity is presented. Once rebutted, the pre-
sumption no longer retains evidentiary value, and the prosecu-
tion must present valid evidence of sanity to create a jury ques-
tion. Thus, the court held that since the evidence presented by
defendant was sufficient to overcome the presumption, and the
prosecution had failed to offer acceptable evidence of sanity, the
trial judge had erred in not directing a verdict for the
defendant.'"
The majority in Milian-Hernandez noted that the presump-
tion issue was one of first impression in South Carolina. The de-
cision is noteworthy because it appears to reject dictum that ap-
peared in the earlier case of State v. Hinson.'4 The court in
Hinson recognized the clear split of authority in other jurisdic-
tions concerning whether the presumption of sanity retains any
evidentiary value after evidence of insanity is introduced."'
287 S.C. at 186, 336 S.E.2d at 477. The court noted the validity of Thompson, but dis-
missed this argument by stating "the circumstances of this Appellant's flight are such as
to negate that permissible inference." Id. But see id., 336 S.E.2d at 478 (Ness, J.,
dissenting).
10. It is interesting that the supreme court chose to grant a directed verdict in this
case because the defendant's only evidence was testimony from medical experts. See
supra note 8. As the court recognized, "A jury may properly disregard expert testimony."
287 S.C. at 186, 336 S.E.2d at 478 (citing State v. Johnson, 66 S.C. 23, 44 S.E. 58 (1903)).
Other jurisdictions have held that failure to directly controvert expert testimony of in-
sanity will not necessarily entitle a defendant to a directed verdict. See Howard v. State,
172 Ala. 402, 55 So. 255 (1911); see also Bowker v. State, 373 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1962);
State v. Bannister, 339 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1960). Even though the court stated that "this
opinion should not be read to require the state to produce expert testimony whenever
the defendant does so," the outcome in this case appears to suggest that the prosecu-
tion's case would be severely weakened without expert testimony. 287 S.C. at 186, 336
S.E.2d at 478.
11. 287 S.C. at 186, 336 S.E.2d at 478.
12. Brief of Respondent at 5-8.
13. 287 S.C. at 186, 336 S.E.2d at 477.
14. 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E.2d 548 (1970).
15. See Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and Sufficiency of Proof
19861
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While refraining from specifically deciding the issue, the Hinson
court stated that earlier decisions "would seem to indicate that
South Carolina is committed to the view that the presumption
of sanity does retain evidentiary value even after the offer of evi-
dence tending to prove insanity."'16
After Milian-Hernandez, the practitioner should be aware
that in South Carolina, once evidence of insanity is presented,
the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of sanity to cre-
ate a jury question.
C. Ben Garren, Jr.
II. RIGID STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS TO USE BREATHALYZER
TESTS OR CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF A DEFENDANT'S BLOOD TO
PROVE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
In 1985 South Carolina's appellate courts handed down two
decisions that construed South Carolina Code section 56-5-2950,
entitled "Implied consent to chemical test to determine alcoholic
content of blood." 7 The decision by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in Town of Fairfax v. Smith"5 and the disposition
of State v. Carrigan' by the court of appeals were narrow con-
structions of the applicability of the statute. In each case, the
court rejected the State's argument that it had complied with
the statute's intent and found that the State failed to follow the
clear statutory requirements necessary to convict a defendant
under section 56-5-2950.
In Smith the defendant, after submitting to a breathalyzer
test, requested an independent test of his blood/alcohol level.
of Mental Irresponsibility in Criminal Case, 17 A.L.R.3D 146 (1968). One view is that the
presumption no longer exists after rebuttal evidence is introduced. See, e.g., People v.
Saylor, 319 111. 205, 149 N.E. 767 (1925). The other view is that the presumption will still
exist to weight the scale in the prosecution's favor. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spencer,
212 Mass. 438, 99 N.E. 266 (1912).
16. 253 S.C. at 620, 172 S.E.2d at 554-55.
17. S.C. COnE ANN. § 56-5-2950(a)(1976) states in part: "The person tested may have
a test or tests in addition to the test administered by the law-enforcement officer
.... The arresting officer or the person conducting the chemical test of the person ap-
prehended shall promptly assist that person to contact a qualified person to conduct
additional tests."
18. 285 S.C. 458, 330 S.E.2d 290 (1985).
19. 284 S.C. 610, 328 S.E.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1985).
[Vol. 38
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The police officer granted this request and transported Mr.
Smith to a local hospital where blood was drawn. Before the
hospital had a chance to analyze the blood sample, however, the
officer seized the sample and sent it to the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division (SLED) for analysis. The defendant was
subsequently convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol
on the basis of the breathalyzer results and the blood analysis
data compiled by SLED.2
On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction on the ground that the officer's actions
constituted a violation of section 56-5-2950(a). This section
grants to a defendant who has submitted to a breathalyzer test
the right to receive affirmative assistance from a police officer in
procuring an independent blood test. 1 The court found that the
officer failed to provide the required assistance when he confis-
cated the blood sample; therefore, the breathalyzer results and
the SLED report were held inadmissible.
22
In Carrigan the defendant was unable to submit to a
breathalyzer test because he had to be transported directly to a
local emergency room for treatment.23 Nevertheless, at trial the
State was able to introduce into evidence the results of a chemi-
cal analysis of Carrigan's blood which had been performed by
the hospital. No testimony, however, was offered regarding the
correlation between the hospital's blood analysis results and in-
toxication. Instead, the State relied on section 56-5-2950(b)
which provides that an accused is presumed to be under the in-
fluence of alcohol when the amount of alcohol in the blood-
stream is equal to or greater than ten one-hundredths of one
percent (0.10%), as determined by a chemical analysis of the ac-
cused person's breath.24 The trial judge assumed section 56-5-
20. 285 S.C. at 459, 330 S.E.2d at 290.
21. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-344(a) (1962)(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-
2950(a) (1976)), construed in State v. Lewis, 266 S.C. 45, 221 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
22. 285 S.C. at 460, 330 S.E.2d at 290.
23. Record at 48; Brief of Respondent at 5.
24. This statutory section states:
In any criminal prosecution.., relating to driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time
of the alleged violation, as shown by chemical analysis of the defendant's
breath, shall give rise to the following presumptions:
(3) If there was at that time ten one-hundredths of one percent or more by
19861
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2950(b) was applicable and included it in his charge to the jury.
Carrigan was subsequently convicted of driving under the
influence.
The court of appeals held that this jury charge was errone-
ous because the presumption contained in section 56-5-2950(b)
arises only when the alcohol level of the blood is determined by
an analysis of the accused person's breath.25 Therefore, the court
reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new
trial so that proper expert testimony could be admitted with the
blood test results.
26
The supreme court in Smith and the court of appeals in
Carrigan narrowly construed section 56-5-2950 and placed the
burden upon the State either to meet the statute's requirements
or to forego using the statute to prosecute defendants. The re-
mand by the court of appeals in Carrigan, which put the State
in the position of prosecuting without the benefit of the pre-
sumption contained in 56-5-2950(b), is of particular importance.
The court recognized that its decision created an anomalous re-
sult: a breathalyzer test could be used to determine an accused's
blood/alcohol level and create a presumption of driving under
the influence, but the same blood/alcohol level when determined
through a chemical analysis of the blood itself could not give rise
to the presumption, although the latter test is inherently more
accurate.27 In the court's opinion, however, this result was com-
pelled by the language and the legislative history of the stat-
ute,28 and the court refused to contravene a legitimate use of
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the de-
fendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950(b)(1976)(emphasis added).
25. 284 S.C. at 616, 328 S.E.2d at 122.
26. Id. at 617, 328 S.E.2d at 123. The court of appeals also rejected Carrigan's other
two grounds of appeal. First, the court found that the trial court did not err in refusing
to grant a mistrial because one of the jurors had a benign conversation with a prosecu-
tion witness. Id. at 614, 328 S.E.2d at 121. Second, the court of appeals affirmed the
defendant's conviction of driving in violation of the Habitual Traffic Offender Act, SC.
CODE ANN. §§ 56-1-1010 to -1130 (1976). The court found that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the trial judge's jury charge defining "habitual offender." 284 S.C. at 614,
328 S.E.2d at 121.
27. Id. at 616-17, 328 S.E.2d at 122.
28. S.C. CODe ANN. § 56-5-2950(b) (1976) is a recodification of S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-
344 (1962) (amended in 1969). The amendment to § 46-344 changed the language from
"... as shown by chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath or other
bodily substance . . ." to the present language that includes only breath. Therefore, the
[Vol. 38
6




In addition, the holdings of Smith and Carrigan have con-
stitutional significance. In State v. Lewis2" the South Carolina
Supreme Court made clear that an accused person's right to
have an opportunity to procure an independent blood test is of
constitutional magnitude. The court in Lewis recognized that an
accused has a due process right to obtain exculpatory evidence
which arises independent of legislative enactment.30 Therefore,
in Smith the officer's act of seizing the blood sample was a con-
stitutional violation because it interfered with Mr. Smith's right
to have his blood independently analyzed for possible exculpa-
tory value.3 1 Likewise, the Carrigan court noted that a statute
that creates a presumption in a criminal case must be construed
strictly since the State's burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt every element of a crime charged is constitutionally com-
pelled by due process of law, and a statutory presumption shifts
this burden.3 2 Thus, the court refused to expand the applicabil-
ity of this presumption by implying a legislative intent and, in-
stead, deferred to the plain meaning of the statutory language.s
Smith and Carrigan indicate that South Carolina courts can
be expected to insist that prosecutions relying on section 56-5-
2950 must rigidly meet the requirements of the statute. When a
police officer's actions deviate from the statutory scheme, statu-
tory and constitutional defenses should be successful.
Michael A. Hill
court found that the intent of the legislature was to exclude a chemical test of an ac-
cused person's blood from the parameters of the statute. 284 S.C. at 616, 328 S.E.2d at
122.
29. 266 S.C. 45, 221 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
30. The defendant in Lewis refused to take the breathalyzer test. The supreme
court held that the right granted by S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-344 (1962) to receive mandatory
assistance from a police officer in procuring an independent test is contingent upon the
accused submitting to a breathalyzer test. The court also held, however, that the defend-
ant has a due process right to procure favorable evidence which arises independent of
the statute. Consequently, in all cases, the state must afford the defendant a reasonable
opportunity to obtain a blood test. 266 S.C. at 48, 221 S.E.2d at 526.
31. The Smith court stated that the purpose of the statutory provision which grants
the accused the right of mandatory assistance to procure an independent test is "to per-
mit an accused person to gather independent evidence to submit in reply to that of the
prosecuting authority." 285 S.C. at 460, 330 S.E.2d at 290. In light of the court's lan-
guage in Lewis, it is clear that this right is one of constitutional proportion.
32. 284 S.C. at 616, 328 S.E.2d at 122; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
33. 284 S.C. at 616, 328 S.E.2d at 122.
1986]
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III. TESTIMONY OF CONVICTED PERJURORS
In State v. Merriman34 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that section 16-9-10 of the South Carolina Code,35 which
prohibited the testimony of a convicted perjuror, was repealed
by implication upon the enactment of section 19-11-60.: 6 Upon
rehearing, the court developed a historical analysis of its conclu-
sion. The court also refused to extend Giglio v. United States
3
7
to allow into evidence the results of a polygraph contained
within an immunity agreement.
The defendants in Merriman were convicted of conspiracy,
kidnapping, and murder. The State granted immunity to its
principal witness, Danny Hogg. Hogg testified that he and Eddie
Merriman had delivered the victim to Paul Mazzell and that
Mazzell had killed the victim. The body was buried in Merri-
man's yard and was not discovered until Hogg turned state's evi-
dence. The appeals of Mazzell and Merriman were consolidated
for decision by the court of appeals.
The first significant ruling in this case concerned the testi-
mony of a convicted perjuror.3 8 When the State offered a witness
who had been convicted of perjury, the appellants objected, cit-
34. 287 S.C. 74, 337 S.E.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1985).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-10 (1976) provides: "Whoever ... shall wilfully and cor-
ruptly commit any manner of wilful perjury ... the oath of such person shall not be
received in any court of record within this State."
36. South Carolina Code § 19-11-60 provides:
No person shall be disqualified to testify in the trial of any cause in the courts
of this State by reason of his conviction and sentence for any crime. The fact
of such conviction and sentence may be established, and the credibility of the
testimony of any such witness shall be entirely for the jury or the court deter-
mining the facts at issue, as the case may be.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-60 (1976).
37. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In Giglio the Supreme Court held that where the govern-
ment's case depends almost entirely on a witness' testimony, credibility becomes an im-
portant issue, and that any agreement concerning future prosecution was both relevant
and admissible.
38. The court also addressed the following grounds for reversal raised by the appel-
lants: (1) the harrassment of witnesses, (2) the prejudicial exchange between the solicitor
and a witness, (3) the disqualification of a juror, (4) the prejudicial reply revealing that
the witness was under the state's protective custody, (5) the unsuccessful use by the
police of an informant to elicit information, and (6) the refusal of the trial judge to make
the charge of self-defense and manslaughter. The court of appeals held that no reversible
error resulted from the trial judge's decision on these issues. 287 S.C. at 79-88, 337
S.E.2d at 221-27.
8
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ing section 16-9-10, which prohibits the testimony of a convicted
perjuror. The trial court allowed the testimony on the basis of
section 19-11-60, which provides that no person convicted of any
crime should be barred from testifying. The court of appeals up-
held the trial judge's decision, stating that the language of sec-
tion 19-11-60 was unequivocal and unambiguous.39 Therefore,
the court reasoned that because the two statutes were inconsis-
tent, the earlier statute was repealed by implication upon the
enactment of section 19-11-60.40
On rehearing the appellants argued that section 24-21-
990(6),'41 which provides that a pardon restores the right to tes-
tify to a convicted perjuror, constituted evidence that the Stat-
ute of Elizabeth4 2 had not been repealed. The court held, how-
ever, that the Statute of Elizabeth was repealed by the express
repealer in section 19-11-60.43 The court also stated that section
24-21-990(6) supported the conclusion that the Statute of Eliza-
beth had been repealed. Under the Statute of Elizabeth, a par-
don did not restore competency to testify.44 Therefore, the Stat-
ute of Elizabeth was inconsistent with sections 24-21-990(6) and
19-11-60.
In a concurring opinion Judge Gardner argued that section
16-9-10 was repealed by section 19-11-60; however, he stated
that section .16-9-10 was reenacted upon recodification. 45 In
Nexsen v. Ward46 the court stated that "any matter which the
Legislature may constitutionally enact as law becomes such
when it has been inserted in the Code, and adopted with it."
' 47
The majority did not address the recodification argument be-
cause it was not raised in the petition.
The court in Merriman also addressed the issue of the ad-
missibility of a polygraph within the terms of an immunity
39. Id. at 80, 337 S.E.2d at 222.
40. Id.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-990 (Supp. 1985) provides: "A pardon shall fully restore
all civil rights lost as a result of a conviction, which shall include the right to: ... (6) not
have his testimony excluded in a legal proceeding if convicted of perjury. . ....
42. Statute of Elizabeth, 1562, 5 Eliz., Ch. 5 (enacted in South Carolina at 2 S.C.
Stat. 401, No. 322 (1712)).
43. 287 S.C. at 93-94, 337 S.E.2d at 229-30.
44. Id. at 94, 337 S.E.2d at 230.
45. Id. at 95, 337 S.E.2d at 230.
46. 96 S.C. 313, 80 S.E. 599 (1914).
47. Id. at 319, 80 S.E. at 601.
1986]
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agreement. Before admitting into evidence Hogg's immunity
agreement, the trial judge deleted reference to the requirement
that Hogg take a lie detector test. Mazzell, citing Giglio v.
United States,48 argued that the entire immunity agreement in-
cluding the polygraph clause should have been admitted. The
court of appeals rejected this argument. The court did not "be-
lieve the U. S. Supreme Court intended by Giglio that every de-
tail of an immunity agreement should become admissible evi-
dence regardless of its admissibility under generally accepted
rules of evidence. '49 The court held that it was within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge to delete the polygraph.50 The court's
decision is consistent with its rejection of the accuracy of a poly-
graph. The decision also reflects a generally uniform position
that a lie detector test is not a reliable means of ascertaining
truth or deception.51
In allowing the testimony of convicted perjurors, the Merri-
man court places South Carolina within the majority of states
which have addressed this issue. The disqualification of wit-
nesses has generally been abandoned either by statute or judicial
decision.5 2 The federal courts do not disqualify convicted
perjurors . 3 Judge Gardner's concurring opinion, however, makes
clear that there must be legislative action to resolve the two in-
consistencies between sections 16-9-10 and 19-11-60.
Connie F. Hoyle-Payne
48. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
49. 287 S.C. at 87, 337 S.E.2d at 226.
50. Id.
51. McCroskey v. United States, 339 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1965); State v. Valdez, 91
Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 343 P.2d 577 (1959);
Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1964); State v. Chang, 46 Hawaii 22,
374 P.2d 5 (1962); People v. Oney, 28 Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963); State v. Mot-
tram, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225 (1962); Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893
(1958); Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963); Henderson v.
State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149,
125 A.2d 442 (1956); State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E.2d 669 (1959); Marable v. State,
203 Tenn. 440, 313 S.W.2d 451 (1958); Lee v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 233, 105 S.E.2d
152 (1958). See generally Annotation, Physiological or Psychological Truth and Decep-
tion Tests, 23 A.L.R.2D 1306 (1952).
52. Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705, 45 S.E. 630 (1903); State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio St.
221, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 372, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961); Clemmons v. State, 39 Tex. Crin. 279,
45 S.W. 911 (1898); Koch v. State, 126 Wis. 470, 106 N.W. 531 (1906).
53. Schoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 38
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IV. SAME EVIDENCE TEST USED TO DECIDE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CASE
In State v. Norton 4 the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
affirmed its use of the same evidence test to decide double jeop-
ardy issues.5 Applying the test, the court in Norton concluded
that violations of sections 16-3-655(1)56 and 16-15-14057 of the
South Carolina Code do not constitute the same offense for
double jeopardy purposes.
Norton was first brought to trial for violation of section 16-
3-655(1) of the South Carolina Code, which prohibits engaging
in sexual battery with a child of less than eleven years of age.58
Sexual battery, as defined in section 16-3-651(h), requires "an
intrusion . . . into the genital or anal openings . . . .'" After
the victim testified that no penetration occurred, counsel for the
defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court granted the
motion.
Subsequently, Norton was reindicted under section 16-15-
140 of the Code for the same incident. Section 16-15-140 prohib-
54. 286 S.C. 95, 332 S.E.2d 531 (1985).
55. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects a defendant against prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal or conviction and protects against multiple punishments for
the same offense at the same trial. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); North Caro-
lina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The double jeopardy safeguards are found in S.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 12, and U.S. CONsT. amend. V (made applicable to the states by U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1). Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). In Norton the court
refers to "former jeopardy"; there is authority which indicates that former jeopardy is
synonymous with double jeopardy. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 587 (5th ed. 1979). The
South Carolina Supreme Court, however, appears to limit former jeopardy to double
jeopardy situations like Norton, which involve multiple prosecutions for the same of-
fense. See State v. Kirby, 269 S.C. 25, 236 S.E.2d 33 (1977).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(1)(1976) provides: "A person is guilty of criminal sex-
ual conduct in the first degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with the victim who
is less than eleven years of age."
57. Section 16-15-140 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person over the age of fourteen years to
wilfully and lewdly commit or attempt any lewd or lascivious act upon or with
the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of fourteen
years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or pas-
sions or sexual desires of such person or of such child.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (1976).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(1) (1976).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(h) (1976). The only form of sexual battery alleged in
Norton's first trial was insertion of defendant's finger into victim's vagina. Therefore, it
was unnecessary to consider any of the other forms of sexual battery.
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its commission of a lewd act upon a child under fourteen years
of age.60 The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to five
years imprisonment. Norton appealed the verdict alleging that
reindictment on the basis of the same facts litigated in the first
trial constituted double jeopardy."6
The supreme court rejected Norton's argument and upheld
the conviction, noting that if a single act constitutes two sepa-
rate offenses, "'the defendant may be severally indicted and
punished for each.' "62 Therefore, the issue was whether viola-
tion of both sections 16-3-655(1) and 16-15-140 was one offense
or two separate offenses. The court stated that "[t]he test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or one
growing out of the same act or transaction is whether each stat-
ute requires proof of a fact which the other does not. '6 3 This
approach is often referred to as the Blockburger test.64 It is also
known as the same evidence test. 5
Applying the same evidence test, the court in Norton de-
cided that the crimes of first degree criminal sexual conduct
with a minor and committing a lewd act upon a minor were sep-
arate offenses. The first requires proof of a sexual battery, while
the second requires proof of a "lewd or lascivious act. . . [done]
with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or
passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child. 66 The
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (1976).
61. Norton also alleged the following: the retrial violated principles of collateral es-
toppel; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (1976) is unconstitutional because it is too vague; and
insufficient proof was presented at trial of intent to arouse the passions or desires of the
defendant for a conviction under S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 to stand. The court ad-
dressed only the collateral estoppel issue in its opinion and rejected Norton's argument
without discussion.
62. 286 S.C. at 96, 332 S.E.2d at 532 (quoting State v. Hall, 280 S.C. 74, 77, 310
S.E.2d 429, 431 (1983)).
63. 286 S.C. at 96, 332 S.E.2d at 532.
64. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
65. Although the definition of the same evidence test is phrased differently from the
Blockburger test, as a practical matter, there is no difference between the two formula-
tions, and the South Carolina Supreme Court uses them interchangeably. See State v.
Lawrence, 266 S.C. 423, 223 S.E.2d 856 (1976).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140. The court also noted that the crime of first degree
criminal sexual conduct with a minor requires that the victim be younger than eleven
years of age, whereas the crime of committing a lewd act with a minor requires the vic-
tim to be under the age of fourteen. This difference in age requirements was not a suffi-
cient difference to defeat the double jeopardy claim because any victim who met the
fourteen year age requirement under § 16-15-140 would also satisfy the eleven year age
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court concluded that Norton had not been subjected to double
jeopardy since each of the crimes required proof of an element
not required by the other.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently used
the same evidence test when determining whether a violation of
more than one statute constitutes the same offense for double
jeopardy purposes.6 7 The Norton decision, however, represents
the court's strictest application of the test. Technically, the
court's conclusion that proving a lewd act requires proof of an
element not required to prove sexual battery was correct, but
appears contrary to a common sense reading of the statutes. It
seems unlikely that an act which constitutes a sexual battery
would not also constitute a lewd act. The crucial element of a
lewd act is the intent of arousing the passions of one of the par-
ticipants. On the other hand, sexual battery is defined as any
intrusion into another's genital or anal openings without regard
to intent. It appears, however, that these acts are such that an
intent to arouse passions can almost be presumed from the act
itself. Norton is, therefore, significant because it indicates the
court's willingness to apply the same evidence test rigidly and
rely upon minor technical differences in statutory criminal ele-
ments to defeat a claim of double jeopardy.
Arguably, a strict application of the same evidence test has
the advantage of providing predictable results. The results, how-
ever, are often strange and harsh. For example, one court using
the same evidence test found a defendant who had cheated in a
card game guilty of seventy-five separate offenses, one for each
hand that was dealt.68 Such a result illustrates that the greatest
shortcoming of the same evidence test is that it lends itself to
mechanical, rigid application, which provides inadequate protec-
tion of double jeopardy rights. This weakness has been the main
target of critics of the same evidence test 9 and has caused many
requirement under § 16-3-655. Therefore, in order to uphold the conviction, the court
had to look for another element required to prove a lewd act that was not required to
prove criminal sexual conduct.
67. See State v. Hall, 280 S.C. 74, 310 S.E.2d 429 (1983); State v. Lawrence, 266 S.C.
423, 223 S.E.2d 856 (1976); State v. Greuling, 257 S.C. 477, 186 S.E.2d 706 (1972); State
v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421 (1972); State v. Steadman, 216 S.C. 579, 59
S.E.2d 168 (1950).
68. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
69. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.09 commentary at 162 (Official
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jurisdictions to reject the test entirely.70
Many courts which continue to utilize the same evidence
test warn that it should not be applied too rigidly because of the
potentially detrimental effect on double jeopardy rights.71 In
Faulkner v. State72 a Florida court adopted a "flexible" ap-
proach to the double jeopardy issue in a case similar to Norton.
Using the same evidence test,73 the Florida Supreme Court in
Faulkner held that a conviction for being "lewd, wanton and las-
civious" barred a subsequent prosecution for indecent exposure
arising out of the same incident.7 4 A strict application of the
same evidence test would have allowed a second trial, but the
Faulkner court reasoned that the two charges were "so closely
related" that a second trial would be improper. As one commen-
tator noted, "This type of approach seems more satisfactory'
than the rigid same evidence test as a means of determining the
identity of offenses. The relevant inquiry should not be whether
any additional fact is required in the second prosecution, but
whether a materially different fact, enough to make a truly dif-
ferent offense, must be shown.1
7 5
This flexible approach to the same evidence test appears to
have been endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Ohio.76 In Brown the Court stated, "The Blockburger
test is not the only standard for determining whether successive
prosecutions impermissibly involve the same offense.
'77
Draft & Revised Comments 1985); Cannon, Double Jeopardy In Oregon, 14 WMLAtmETE
L.J. 21, 29 (1977); Note, Criminal Law: The Same Offense in Oklahoma - Now You See
It, Now You Don't, 28 0KLA. L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1975).
70. See, eg., Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970); People v. White, 390
Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973). Some jurisdictions have
rejected the same evidence through legislative enactments. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.035 (1963)(amended 1983).
71. See State v. Ahuna, 52 Haw. 321, 474 P.2d 704 (1970); State v. Currie, 41 N.J.
531, 197 A.2d 678 (1964).
72. 146 Fla. 769, 1 So. 2d 857 (1941).
73. See King v. State, 145 Fla. 286, 199 So. 38 (1940)(same evidence test applied;
court held that acquittal for aiding and abetting arson did not bar prosecution for aiding
and abetting arson with intent to defraud an insurer).
74. 146 Fla. at 770, 1 So. 2d at 857.
75. Haddad & Mulock, Double Jeopardy Problems in the Definition of the Same
Offense: State Discretion to Invoke the Criminal Process Twice, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 515,
633 (1970)(emphasis in original).
76. 432 U.S. 161 (1977)
77. Id. at 166 n.6. The Brown court cited In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889), with
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The South Carolina Supreme Court initially appeared to
adopt the view that the same evidence test should not be
mechanically applied. In State v. Switzer" the court stated that
the same evidence test "while perhaps not infallible, will gener-
ally prove useful and adequate. e79 The court in Norton, how-
ever, did not question the infallibility of the same evidence test.
In failing to do so, the court has established a precedent which
may result in a diminution of defendants' double jeopardy rights
for the sake of strict adherence to the same evidence test.
Frank A. Schiller
V. JURY CHARGES AND LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Hilton0
reaffirmed the longstanding South Carolina rule that, at a de-
fendant's request, a trial judge must instruct the jury as to lesser
included offenses if there is any evidence that the defendant is
guilty of only a lesser offense.8 ' The South Carolina Supreme
Court had previously ruled in State v. Self 82 that a lower court
erred in not charging assault and battery of a high and aggra-
vated nature along with assault and battery with intent to kill
where the facts were disputed. Since due process was not di-
rectly implicated, Hilton could have been decided strictly on the
basis of South Carolina law. The decision, however, begins with
a due process analysis and, therefore, raises a question of
whether a charge on the lesser included offense is a constitu-
tional right.
In Hilton evidence existed from which the jury could have
concluded that the defendant was guilty of only the lesser of-
fense of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.
approval. In Nielsen the Supreme Court held that a conviction for cohabitation for two
and one-half years barred a subsequent prosecution of either defendant for adultery,
even though the two crimes required completely different elements of proof.
78. 65 S.C. 187, 43 S.E. 513 (1903).
79. Id. at 190, 43 S.E. at 514.
80. 284 S.C. 245, 325 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1985).
81. State v. Jones, 133 S.C. 167, 130 S.E. 747 (1925). In State v. Funchess, 267 S.C.
427, 229 S.E.2d 331 (1976), the court held that the rule is inapplicable when no conflict
exists on any element of the higher offense.
82. 225 S.C. 267, 82 S.E.2d 63 (1954).
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The defendant and the victim were arguing while standing be-
side a railroad crossing when the accident occurred. Conflicting
evidence was presented to show whether the defendant pushed
the victim into an oncoming train, the victim accidently fell into
the train's path, or the victim turned and bolted into the oncom-
ing train.s The offenses discussed in Hilton were assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature and assault and battery
with intent to kill. The element of specific intent to kill distin-
guishes these offenses. 4 If a jury believes the defendant is guilty
of some offense and a charge on the lesser offense is not
presented, the defendant might be found guilty even though the
element of specific intent to kill is not proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. Due process requires not only proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, but "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime." 5 The possibility that a jury
may convict with insufficient proof of specific intent arguably el-
evates instruction on the lesser offense to a constitutional
right.86
In all federal and state proceedings, a court's failure to give
a requested charge on lesser included offenses is reversible er-
ror. 87 The Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama"s held that a
charge on a lesser offense was a due process requirement in capi-
tal cases, expressly reserving the question in noncapital cases.89
Perhaps because all jurisdictions require the instruction when
requested, the urgency of the question in noncapital cases has
diminished. There has been no specific ruling on since Beck.90
83. 284 S.C. at 247, 325 S.E.2d at 576. Two witnesses testified that they saw Hilton
push the victim into the train. A detective testified that on the night of the accident,
Hilton told him that the victim slipped and fell. At trial Hilton testified that the victim
bolted into the train of his own volition.
84. 284 S.C. at 248, 325 S.E.2d at 576.
85. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
86. If a jury is only given a choice of not guilty or guilty of the greater offense, it
might tend to punish what is obviously culpable conduct, even though every element is
not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973)
(cited in Hilton, 284 S.C. at 249, 325 S.E.2d at 577).
87. 412 U.S. at 205.
88. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
89. Id. at 638 n.14.
90. The Court indicated an unwillingness to expand the holding of Beck in Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In Spaziano the defendant was brought to trial after the
statute of limitations had run on the lesser offense. The trial judge offered the instruc-
tion on the lesser offense if the defendant would agree to waive the statute of limitations
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Resolution of this issue may determine whether there is a
federal question basis for federal jurisdiction, either in a habeas
corpus proceeding or on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The circuit courts of appeal are currently divided on whether
acceptance of jurisdiction, solely for failure to give a charge on a
lesser offense, is proper with regard to habeas corpus proceed-
ings.9 1 Federal jurisdiction can be asserted in good faith as long
as the due process question is left open. Although the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the jurisdiction
question, when it arises, Hilton will be persuasive authority for
the argument that a defendant's due process rights are impli-
cated by a court's failure to instruct the jury, at a defendant's
request, on lesser included offenses.
Albert L. Norton, Jr.
VI. CORPORATE OFFIcER'S KNOWLEDGE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
IMPUTED TO CORPORATION
In South Carolina Law Enforcement Division v. The
"Michael and Lance"92 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that a corporate officer's knowledge of his plan to use the
corporation's shrimp trawler for illegal purposes was imputed to
the corporation such to make the trawler subject to forfeiture
under section 44-53-530 of the South Carolina Code.93 In making
this ruling, the supreme court quashed a decision of the court of
appeals94 which held that the trawler was exempt from forfeiture
under the "innocent owner" provision 95 of the statute. The court
defense. The defendant refused and was convicted of the greater capital offense. The
Supreme Court affirmed.
91. See Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1982), and cases cited therein.
92. 284 S.C. 368, 327 S.E.2d 327 (1985).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-530 (1976)(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-
520(A)(5) (1976)) provides in part: "all conveyances including ... water going vessels
which are used or intended for use to unlawfully conceal, contain, or transport or in any
manner facilitate the unlawful concealment, containment, or transportation of controlled
substances and their compounds shall, except as otherwise provided herein, be forfeited
to the states."
94. S.C. Law Enforcement Div. v. The "Michael and Lance," 281 S.C. 339, 315
S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 1984).
95. This exception provides that property of an owner will not be forfeited unless
such owner was "a consenting party to, or privy to, or had knowledge of the concealment,
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of appeals had reasoned that the agent was not acting "within
the course of his employment and scope of his authority" when
he used the trawler to haul marijuana. e6 Thus, his knowledge
was not imputed to the corporation, making the corporation an
"innocent owner." The supreme court's decision is a peculiar ap-
plication of the relevant principles of agency law.
The "Michael and Lance" was a shrimp trawler that was
entirely owned by C & B Seafood Company (C & B), a South
Carolina corporation formed and owned in equal shares by G. S.
Crosby, Sr., and James L. Bryant.9 7 Crosby and Bryant also
served as the corporation's only directors and officers. The trial
court found that Crosby provided the entire financial backing
for the purchase of the trawler, and Bryant was to provide ser-
vices involving the day-to-day operation of the boat as a com-
mercial fishing vessel.98 It was further determined that on or
about November 6, 1980, Bryant took the "Michael and Lance"
to shrimp off the coast of Florida.9 On his return trip to
Charleston, Bryant agreed to haul marijuana for a friend. Bryant
entered into the smuggling enterprise on his own initiative, with-
out the authority, actual knowledge, or consent of C & B or
Crosby.100 On December 19, 1980, Bryant was arrested aboard
the "Michael and Lance" and charged with illegally transporting
marijuana. South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED)
agents seized the trawler and began an action for forfeiture.
In light of the trial court's findings of fact, the supreme
court's decision to impute the agent's knowledge of his illegal
intentions to the corporation and to bar its claim of innocent
owner is an interesting application of South Carolina agency law.
In its opinion, the court of appeals correctly stated that "a prin-
cipal is affected with constructive knowledge of all material facts
of which the agent receives notice while acting within the scope
containment, or transportation of a controlled substance." S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-530
(1976)(emphasis added)(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-586(B)(1) (1976)).
96. 281 S.C. at 342, 315 S.E.2d at 173.
97. Record at 31, 41.
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id. at 22, 23.
100. Id. at 13, 21, 28. A corporate resolution stated "no partner shall buy any goods
or articles without the prior consent of the other Director and Stockholder," and "no
Director or Stockholder shall.., knowingly condone anything whereby the corporate
property may be attached or taken in execution, without the written consent of the other
Director and Stockholder." Brief of Respondent at 5-7.
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of his authority." 101 This rule is "based on the duty of the agent
to communicate all material information to the principal and the
presumption that he has done so."'01 2 Additionally, "an equally
well-recognized exception to this general rule exists in situations
where the agent is acting fraudulently against his principal or
for any other reason has an interest in concealing his acquired
knowledge from his principal."'0 °
Under these agency principles, it appears that the court of
appeals was correct in finding that "[o]bviously it was not neces-
sary for Bryant to smuggle marijuana to accomplish the purpose
of his employment as master of the "Michael and Lance" or fur-
ther the business of C & B Seafood ... ." Since Bryant was
acting outside of the scope of his authority and course of his
employment, there could be no imputation of knowledge of the
illegal activity. 04 Nevertheless, the supreme court found that
even if Bryant was not acting within the scope of his authority
when he actually hauled the marijuana, "he was certainly an of-
ficer of the corporation when he surrendered it to himself as a
drug smuggler."' 0 5 The court imputed his knowledge to the cor-
poration and precluded C & B's claim of innocent owner.
An explanation for the supreme court's decision to disallow
C & B's claim of "innocent owner" is that the court was con-
fronted with lawful attempts by the SLED to combat drug
smuggling and the use of seagoing vessels for such purposes. The
decision in The "Michael and Lance" may reflect the court's in-
tent to facilitate the war against drug smuggling in South Caro-
lina by fully penalizing those engaging in it. To apply the "inno-
cent owner" provision in this instance would lessen the statutory
penalties for drug smuggling. Indeed, many forfeiture statutes,
including the federal statutes, do not have "innocent owner"
101. 281 S.C. at 341, 315 S.E.2d at 173 (citing Crystal Ice Co. of Columbia v. First
Colonial Corp., 273 S.C. 306, 257 S.E.2d 496 (1979)).
102. McSweeney v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 128 F.2d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 1942)(cit-
ing Knobelock v. Germania Sav. Bank, 50 S.C. 259, 27 S.E. 962 (1896)).
103. Crystal Ice, 273 S.C. at 309, 257 S.E.2d at 498.
104. 281 S.C. at 342, 315 S.E.2d at 173.
105. 284 S.C. at 370, 327 S.E.2d at 328. This reasoning conflicts with the exception
stated in Crystal Ice. See 273 S.C. at 309, 257 S.E.2d at 498. It seems that an agent
would certainly have reason to conceal from the principal his intention to allow the prin-
cipal's conveyance to be used for illegal purposes. Therefore, his knowledge should not
be imputed to the principal.
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This explanation appears more plausible in light of Bryant's
position as a fifty percent shareholder and officer of the corpora-
tion.10 7 Certainly this situation is different from a situation in
which a mere employee of a large, publicly held corporation had
committed a similar crime without authority or consent from the
corporation. The court may have felt that application of the "in-
nocent owner" provisions in this instance would have allowed a
criminal to escape full punishment by hiding behind the fic-
tional entity of a corporation.
The "innocent owner" provision, however, does not distin-
guish between closely held and publicly held corporations. Fur-
thermore, the determinations of whether there should be an "in-
nocent owner" exception or whether its application is to be
limited are decisions that should be left for the legislature. 108
Nevertheless, practitioners should be aware that the Supreme
Court of South Carolina may impute an officer's knowledge to a
106. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (1981); 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 781, 782 (1963); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-13-49 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-112 (1981).
107. Indeed, the court puts great emphasis on the fact that Bryant was "certainly an
officer of the corporation when he surrendered [the trawler] to himself as a drug smug-
gler. 284 S.C. at 370, 327 S.E.2d at 328 (emphasis added). Additionally, the appellant
argued that, "[k]nowledge possessed by an officer of a corporation will be imputed to the
corporation even if the knowledge was obtained outside the scope of employment where
the knowledge is apparently relevant to the interests of the corporation." Brief of Appel-
lant at 12-16. As authority for this premise, respondent cited Young v. Pitts, 155 S.C.
414, 152 S.E. 640 (1930). But the court of appeals sufficiently distinguished this case. See
281 S.C. at 342 n.1, 315 S.E.2d at 137 n.1. Furthermore, as stated in the North Carolina
case of Cheek v. Squires, 200 N.C. 661, 670-71, 158 S.E. 198, 203 (1931), most courts take
the view that, "a corporation is not chargeable with knowledge of its officers with respect
to a transaction, in which he is acting in his own behalf . . .. Only that knowledge
which its officers acquire while acting in its behalf and which it is his duty to communi-
cate to it, is imputed by the law to a corporation." See also Kenineally v. First Nat'l
Bank of Anolca, 400 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1968).
It could be argued that, because of the closely held nature of the corporation, the
supreme court was actually applying partnership law. Yet, the applicable partnership
provisions would appear to preclude such a determination. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-
340, 350 (1976).
108. See 281 S.C. at 343, 315 S.E.2d at 174. Interestingly enough, other states which
have "innocent owner" provisions have applied them in a number of situations to ex-
empt an innocent owner from forfeiting a conveyance used to transport contraband with-
out his knowledge. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703 (Harrison 1982) and its applica-
tion in City of Clearwater v. One 1980 Porsche S.C., V.I.N. 91A0140918, 426 So. 2d 1260
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Garcia v. State, 398 So. 2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); In re
Forfeiture of 1979 Ford Truck, V.I.N. F14HNEC1331, 389 So. 2d 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
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closely held corporation, even if he is apparently beyond the
scope of his authority, if fairness or crime prevention dictate
such a result.
C. Ben Garren, Jr.
VII. LIMITATION OF PRISONER'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
While addressing the nineteen exceptions'"9 to defendant's
murder trial and capital punishment sentencing, the South Car-
olina Supreme Court in State v. Gaskins" ° held that a defend-
ant cannot waive his right to a fair trial as a result of strategic
decisions made by defense counsel."" Additionally, the court in-
dicated that prisoners in South Carolina do not have fourth
amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
1 2
The court found Donald "Pee Wee" Gaskins guilty of assas-
sinating Rudolph Tyner, an inmate on death row at the South
Carolina Central Correctional Institution. At the time of his
death, Tyner was awaiting execution for his 1979 conviction for
the murders of Mr. and Mrs. William B. Moon. 1 3 Tony Cimo,
the Moon's son, contacted Gaskins, who was then serving ten life
109. Several exceptions are not discussed herein. The court granted deference to
trial court's discretion regarding exceptions 1, 2, 3, and 5 concerning jury selection. See
State v. Spann, 279 S.C. 399, 308 S.E.2d 518 (1983). Exception 7 concerning restriction
on cross-examination of state's witness was found cumulative and nonprejudicial. See
State v. Atchison, 268 S.C. 588, 235 S.E.2d 294, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894 (1977). Excep-
tion 8 concerning trial judges error in ruling on scope of counsel's direct examination was
found cumulative. Id. Exception 9 concerning error in not forcing a witness to take the
stand to plead fifth amendment privilege not to testify was found cumulative. Id. Excep-
tion 10, addressing trial judge's 22 interjections of personal opinions and comments at
trial, was found nonprejudicial. Exception 11 concerning improper comments by solicitor
on Gaskins' failure to testify was found harmless. Exception 12 addressing an unconsti-
tutional charge of malice given to the jury was found harmless. See State v. Elmore, 279
S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1984). Exceptions 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19 concerning aggra-
vating and mitigating material for capital sentencing phase were all found proper. Ex-
ception 15, addressing the propriety of admitting evidence of defendant's racial
prejudice, was found nonprejudicial. State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 326 S.E.2d 132, cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2368 (1985).
110. 284 S.C. 105, 326 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2368 (1985).
111. Id. at 114, 326 S.E.2d at 138 (exception 4).
112. Id. at 115-16, 326 S.E.2d at 138-39 (exception 6).
113. Id. at 110, 326 S.E.2d at 136.
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sentences for his 1978 guilty plea to eight counts of murder.11"
Gaskins, Cimo, and others conspired to assassinate Tyner. After
an unsuccessful attempt, Gaskins used an explosive device that
he had prepared to kill Tyner.
115
At the jury selection over 160 potential jurors were ex-
amined before the jury of twelve with four alternates was
seated." 6 On appeal defendant asserted various exceptions to
this stage of the trial. The most notable exception questioned
the limitation on defense counsel's strategic decisions. During
their voir dire examination, two jurors stated that they believed
Gaskins was guilty of murdering Tyner. Both jurors, however,
appeared to favor a life sentence rather than capital punish-
ment. Defense counsel attempted to seat these veniremen,
thereby waiving the defendant's right to a fair trial in return for
the increased chance of an imposition of life imprisonment at
the sentencing stage." 7 In support of this effort, defendant cited
State v. Vaughn"18 which noted, "A party may waive a constitu-
tional as well as a statutory provision for his benefit .... ",,9
Nevertheless, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
decision to excuse the veniremen" ° and rejected defense coun-
sel's argument by restating that it is the duty of the trial judge
"to assure himself that each and every prospective juror is unbi-
ased, fair, and impartial.""' The court indicated that although a
defendant has the right to reject a number of prospective jurors,
he does not have a right to select certain individuals to be seated
as jurors.122 The right to reject is further assurance of defend-
ant's right to a fair jury, a right which cannot be waived for stra-
tegic purposes.
1141. Id.
115. Id. at 111-12, 326 S.E.2d at 136-37.
116. Brief of Appellant at 2.
117. 284 S.C. at 114, 326 S.E.2d at 138; see Brief of Appellant at 18-20.
118. 95 S.C. 455, 79 S.E. 312 (1913).
119. Id. at 462, 79 S.E. at 315.
120. The court also stated that the dismissal of the veniremen was justified because
neither potential juror could have voted for the death penalty and were, therefore, una-
ble to render a verdict of guilty according to law as required by S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20
(E) (1976). See State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037
(1980).
121. 284 S.C. at 114, 326 S.E.2d at 138. The court cited State v. Holland, 261 S.C.
488, 201 S.E.2d 118 (1973), where the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld judge's
decision that the jury had not been prejudiced by pretrial publicity.
122. See State v. Praeter, 26 S.C. 198, 2 S.E. 108 (1887).
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The Gaskins court also considered whether the trial court
properly admitted evidence that was secured during two war-
rantless searches and seizures which Gaskins claimed violated
his fourth amendment rights. 123 After the explosion in Tyner's
cell, Gaskins was transferred to maximum security for "investi-
gation and security purposes." During the transfer, Department
of Corrections investigators were authorized to conduct a war-
rantless seizure of Gaskins' personal effects and were told to
look through the prisoner's belongings for evidence relating to
the Tyner murder.12 4 The investigators discovered various in-
criminating items, including thirty-eight cassette tapes that con-
tained recorded conversations between Gaskins and his co-
conspirators.
After confiscating the tapes, a Department of Corrections
investigator seized an address book belonging to Gaskins after
discovering that it contained the name and telephone number of
Tony Cimo, the son of the Tyner murder victims. 125 This seizure
occurred while the investigator was interviewing Gaskins, who
was then in a prison infirmary. Gaskins had apparently asked
the investigator to hand him a letter located in a bedside
drawer. In doing so, the investigator noticed that the letter was
inside an address book. As he looked through the book, the in-
vestigator found Cimo's name and telephone number.'26
Defendant argued that his fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure had been violated, and,
consequently, the evidence should be suppressed. 127 He relied on
State v. Ellefson,2 s in which the court stated that "even a con-
victed prisoner does not shed basic constitutional rights at the
prison gate. Rather, he 'retains all the rights of an ordinary citi-
zen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
away from him by law.' "129 Ellefson held that carrying out a
warrantless exploratory search and copying a pretrial detainee's
outgoing letters without a legitimate purpose or probable cause
or exigent circumstances were violations of detainee's first and
123. 284 S.C. at 115-16, 326 S.E.2d at 138-39.
124. Record at 3066, 3072-73.
125. 284 S.C. at 115-16, 326 S.E.2d at 139.
126. Record at 3533.
127. Brief of Appellant at 23-28.
128. 266 S.C. 494, 500, 224 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1976).
129. Id. (quoting Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944)).
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fourth amendment rights.2 0
Despite its previous holding in Ellefson, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held in Gaskins that the searches and seizures,
including playing the tapes and seizing the address book, were
valid and affirmed the trial court's decision not to suppress evi-
dence obtained through those seizures. The court stated that
"the search was reasonable; Gaskins had no right of an expecta-
tion of privacy and the exigencies of the circumstances war-
ranted the action taken by the prison authorities."''1 The court
cited Hudson v. Palmer'3 2 and Block v. Rutherford,133 two re-
cent United States Supreme Court decisions that addressed the
issue of prisoners' rights. In both Hudson and Block, the United
States Supreme Court held that random, warrantless searches of
the cells of a convicted prisoner and a pretrial detainee were rea-
sonable.134 While noting that this was the first time that the
court had been directly called upon to decide the issue, the ma-
jority in Hudson held that "the Fourth Amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines
of the prison cell."' 35
Although the underpinnings of the decisions in Hudson and
Block were based on the importance of maintaining prison se-
curity,131 other courts have construed the broad language in
Hudson to apply to all prison searches and seizures, regardless
of the reasons given for conducting them. In Hanrahan v.
130. The court in Rilefson stressed that the prisoner "was merely in pretrial con-
finement." Id.
131. 284 S.C. at 116, 326 S.E.2d at 139.
132. 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
133. 468 U.S. 576, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984).
134. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28, 104 S.Ct. at 3201; Block, 468 U.S. at 591, 104 S. Ct.
at 3235.
135. 468 U.S. at 526, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. The Court stated in Hudson: "A prison
shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel
room .... A right of privacy is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual
surveillance of inmates and their cells required to insure institutional security and inter-
nal order." Id. at 527, 104 S. Ct. at 3201. Additionally, the court stated that this ruling
applied equally to seizures. Id. at 528 n.8, 104 S. Ct. at 3201 n.8.
136. "Determining whether an expectation of privacy is 'legitimate' or 'reasonable'
necessarily entails a balancing of interests. . . . [w]e strike the balance in favor of insti-
tutional security which we have noted is 'central to all other correctional goals.'" Hud-
son, 468 U.S. at 527, 104 S. Ct. at 3201. In Block the Court stated that the "shakedown"
searches "were reasonable responses by (the) officials to legitimate security concerns."
468 U.S. at 591, 104 S. Ct. at 3235 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)).
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Lane'37 the Seventh Circuit precluded the prisoner from bring-
ing a fourth amendment challenge to a "shakedown" search of
his cell. The court held that Hudson controlled, even though the
prisoner maintained that the search was in retaliation for failure
to pay an extortion demand to the prison guards and no prison
security implications were involved. 13 8 In Cook v. City of New
York 39 the court held that under Hudson seizure of a tele-
phone-address book from the cell of a pretrial detainee was not
a violation of the detainee's fourth amendment rights. In sup-
porting its decision, the court noted the prison security interests
emphasized in Hudson,140 but made no attempt to show that the
address book itself was a threat to security. Similarly, in Gas-
kins the Supreme Court of South Carolina supported its deci-
sion by stating that "the exigencies of the circumstances war-
ranted the action taken by the prison authorities."' 4 ' The court,
however, did not establish why playing the cassette tapes and
seizing the address book were necessary for prison security.'42
The searches and seizures in Gaskins were admittedly of a
purely investigatory nature14 and unrelated to any security con-
cerns. Therefore, it appears that the Supreme Court of South
Carolina is giving broad application to the Hudson decision, as
did the courts in Hanrahan and Cook. Consequently, it is doubt-
ful that a prisoner in South Carolina can bring a fourth amend-
ment claim against any search or seizure regardless of its under-
lying purposes.
C. Ben Garren, Jr.
137. 747 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 1139. The court stated that Hudson "precludes challenges to prison cell
searches taken for any reason, whether or not reasonable."
139. 607 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
140. Id. at 704.
141. 284 S.C. at 116, 326 S.E.2d at 139.
142. The bombing occurrence warranted the initial search of Gaskins personal ef-
fects for dangerous contraband. See United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982) (where defendant was under suspicion for send-
ing a letter bomb, warrantless search of cell found valid). Nevertheless, this does not
justify the playing of the cassette and the search through the address book in Gaskins
because these items in no way threatened prison security. See Brief of Appellant at 23-
28.
143. Brief of Appellant at 23-28.
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VIII. RIGHT TO JURY INSTRUCTION ON SELF-DEFENSE MAY BE
WAIVED
The constitutional right to a jury instruction on the defense
of self-defense now may be waived by a criminal defendant in
South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in State v.
144Stone, overruled previous decisions to the contrary, including
State v. Brice 45 and State v. Adkinson.
14
6
The defendant was convicted of assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature and assaulting a law enforcement of-
ficer while resisting arrest. At trial the defendant did not request
a jury instruction on the law of self-defense. Evidence presented
at trial would have supported such a defense. 147 On appeal the
defendant claimed a violation of his state constitutional right to
have the judge "declare the law.' 4  The defendant relied on
Brice, which held that where there is any evidence that would
support the defense of self-defense, a judge errs by failing to
charge the jury on the defense, whether it is requested by the
defendant or not.1
4 9
The court in Stone cited the same language used earlier in
Brice to state the defendant's constitutional right: "[The consti-
tutional] provision requires a judge to 'explain so much of the
criminal law as is applicable to the issues made by the evidence
adduced at trial.' "150 Prior to Stone, cases in which there was
evidence of self-defense were an exception to the general rule
that by failing to request a charge, a defendant in a non-capital
case waives his right to have the law declared.' 5' In Brice the
144. 285 S.C. 386, 330 S.E.2d 286 (1985).
145. 190 S.C. 208, 2 S.E.2d 391 (1939).
146. 280 S.C. 85, 311 S.E.2d 79 (1983).
147. Record at 127.
148. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 21: "Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of
fact, but shall declare the law." Art. V, § 17, cited in the opinion, was redesignated § 21
by the 1985 amendment to the constitution.
149. Brice, 190 S.C. at 210, 2 S.E.2d at 392.
150. 285 S.C. at 387, 330 S.E.2d at 287 (quoting State v. White, 211 S.C. 276, 44
S.E.2d 741 (1947)). This language appears to have originated in State v. DuRant, 87 S.C.
532, 534, 70 S.E. 306, 307 (1910).
151. See, e.g., State v. Humphrey, 276 S.C. 42, 274 S.E.2d 918 (1981)(value of prop-
erty allegedly stolen in grand larceny prosecution less than $50); State v. Jamison, 221
S.C. 312, 70 S.E.2d 342 (1952)(definition of "reasonable doubt and provocation"); State
v. Duck, 210 S.C. 94, 41 S.E.2d 628 (1947)(applicability of circumstantial evidence). See
generally Annotation, Duty of Trial Court to Instruct on Self-Defense in Absence of
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court had imposed the duty on the trial judge because self-de-
fense was deemed a "distinct" defense.152 It is unclear what is
meant by "distinct." The rule in Brice was particularly compel-
ling because the defendant was unrepresented by counsel. In ad-
dition, the rule was upheld as recently as 1984 in Adkinson, in
which the defendant was represented by counsel.
Stone and prior South Carolina cases do not state the policy
grounde for requiring self-defense instructions sua sponte while
making other instructions waivable. Perhaps those decisions im-
plicitly recognize that the issue is inextricably bound up in the
central elements of the alleged offense. In order to be considered
a criminal offense, violent conduct on the part of the defendant
must be unjustified. 153 Unlawfulness can be considered an ele-
ment of the offense.154 One could argue that a defendant is enti-
tled to an instruction on the lawfulness of his conduct just as he
is entitled to instruction on any other element, and that a de-
fendant should not be required to request jury instructions on
each element.
A related issue is whether requiring the defendant to prove
self-defense improperly shifts the burden of proof, in violation
of the mandate of In re Winship 55 that "the Due Process clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."' 56 The Supreme Court has
never resolved this issue, but noted in Engle v. Isaac57 that a
"colorable constitutional claim" was made by the argument that
"once the defendant raises the possibility of self-defense, . . .
the state must disprove that defense as part of its task of estab-
Request by Accused, 56 A.L.R.2D 1170 (1957).
152. Brice, 190 S.C. at 210, 2 S.E.2d at 392. The opinion cites State v. Faulkner, 151
S.C. 379, 149 S.E.108 (1929), which involved a "right to eject" as a defendant home-
owner's affirmative defense in homicide prosecution. Faulkner does not clarify the mean-
ing of "distinct." Possibly the "distinct" designation is an oblique reference to the dis-
tinction in South Carolina law between affirmative defenses, for which the defendant has
the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and other trial issues. If that is
the case, one would expect the Brice rule to apply to other affirmative defenses as well.
153. See W. McANINCH & W. FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 302
(1982 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter McANINCH & FAIREY].
154. See id.
155. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
156. Id. at 364.
157. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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lishing guilty mens rea, voluntariness, and unlawfulness."'158 Al-
though a strong argument can be made that placing the burden
of proof of self-defense on the defendant may implicate the due
process clause of the United States Constitution,15 9 the South
Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held that there is no
constitutional infirmity in the practice. 60 Thus, in a slightly dif-
ferent context, due process does not preclude placing on the de-
fendant the procedural burdens of an affirmative defense,
"which constitutes. . . a complete refutation of the crime in the
first place.''
1 6
A possible rationale for reversal of Brice is the passage in
1953 of what is now section 17-23-100 of the South Carolina
Code,16 2 giving litigants in a criminal trial the opportunity to ob-
ject to charges or omitted charges out of the presence of the
jury. 6 3 In State v. Williams 6 4 the supreme court construed sec-
tion 17-23-100 to nullify the line of cases holding certain objec-
tions to jury charges non-waivable. 6 5 Section 17-23-100, there-
fore, obviates the necessity of imposing upon trial counsel the
"delicate and difficult task of presenting exceptions to the
charge before the retirement of the jury ... ."6' There are two
problems with this rationale. It is not clear that the earlier Brice
interpretation of a defendant's constitutional rights was pre-
mised on the defendant's opportunity to object without preju-
dicing his case. In addition, the Adkinson case was decided in
1984, long after passage of section 17-23-100 and its interpreta-
tion in State v. Williams.
State v. Stone flatly overrules State v. Brice and State v.
Adkinson. It is likely that other defense arguments traditionally
regarded as affirmative defenses, such as acting in defense of
158. Id. at 121-22.
159. See McANINCH & FAIREY, supra note 153, at 301.
160. See State v. Glover, 284 S.C. 152, 326 S.E.2d 150 (1985); State v. Hardy, 283
S.C. 590, 325 S.E.2d 320 (1985).
161. Thomas v. Leeke, 725 F.2d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
105 S.Ct. 218 (1984).
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-23-100 (1976). This argument was made to the court in
Brief of Respondent at 2.
163. See also State v. Smith, 279 S.C. 440, 308 S.E.2d 794 (1983).
164. 266 S.C. 325, 223 S.E.2d 38 (1976).
165. Id. at 335, 223 S.E.2d at 43.
166. Coleman v. Lurey, 199 S.C. 442, 447, 20 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1942).
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others, insanity, defense of property, or entrapment, will also be
deemed waivable in South Carolina courts.
Albert L. Norton, Jr.
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